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TEXT OF STATUTE
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part:
Rule 609.

Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime,

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of
a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during
cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweights its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless
of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not
admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the
date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the
confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later
date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that
the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicail effect.
However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to
the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use
such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity
to contest the use of such evidence.

iv.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Was Mr. Morehouse denied effective assistance of counsel
where defense counsel advised him not to testify based on a
misunderstanding of the Rules of Evidence?

v.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 860193-CA

JAMES MOREHOUSE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a Petition for Rehearing of a decision filed by
this court on January 12, 1988. This case was appealed from a
conviction for Aggravated Arson, a second degree felony, in the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the facts set forth in the slip opinion at
page 1 and the top of page 2, the following facts are pertinent:
Mr. Morehouse had informed defense counsel that he wished
to testify and that he could explain his whereabouts during a
critical half hour period prior to the first fire (Vol. 7, 36). The
prosecutor believed that Mr. Morehouse's whereabouts during the half
hour prior to the first fire were critical to the case, and during
closing argument referred to that half hour period as crucial at
least three times (T. Vol. 6, p. 12, 13 14) and an additional time
in rebuttal (T. Vol. 6, 62-63).

The prosecutor also pointed out

twice in closing and once in rebuttal argument that there was no

evidence indicating Mr. Morehouse's whereabouts during this half
hour period (T. Vol. 6, P. 13, 14, 63) and suggested that Morehouse
set the first fire during that time period, then drove to Sandy
(T. Vol. 6, p. 14).
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense
counsel testified that the time period prior to the first fire where
Mr. Morehouse's whereabouts were unaccounted for was critical to the
case.

Defense counsel testified further at the hearing on the

motion that he misunderstood Utah Rules of Evidence 609 and that
based on that misunderstanding, he advised Mr. Morehouse not to
testify because Mr. Morehouse would be required "to respond not only
as to the fact of his prior convictions, but as to the number and
nature" making it impossible "to make Mr. Morehouse presentable to
the jury."

Dissenting opinion J. Jackson, slip opinion at 7.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The majority opinion in State v. Morehouse, No.

860193-CA, slip op. (Utah App. January 12, 1988) misconstrued and
misapprehended the facts and law in finding that Mr. Morehouse's
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was not
violated where counsel, based on a misunderstanding of the rules of
evidence, advised Mr. Morehouse not to testify without moving to
suppress Mr. Morehouse's prior convictions.

The assumptions of the

majority that (1) the focus of the prosecution was on the first
fire; (2) had Mr. Morehouse testified, inconsistencies would have
been further developed; and (3) had Mr. Morehouse testified, the
jury would have been informed that Mr. Morehouse had been convicted
-2-

of a felony are faulty.

Furthermore, it is critical to the majority

opinion that the opinion clarify which conviction(s) under which
subsection of Utah R. Evidence 609 would have been admitted.
Finally, the Court's conclusion that trial counsel's advice was
based on legitimate trial tactics does not reflect the facts in this
case.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35,
Utah Rules of Court of Appeals.

In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g,

11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case be made. We
must be convinced that the court failed to consider
some material point in the case, or that it erred in
its conclusions. . • .
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913) this
Court added:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in
proper cases. When this court, however, has
considered and decided all of the material questions
involved in a case, a rehearing should not be
applied for, unless we have misconstrued or
overlooked some statute or decision which may affect
the result, or that we have based the decision on
some wrong principle of law, or have either
misapplied or overlooked something which materially
affects the result. . . . If there are some
reasons, however, such as we have indicated above,
or other good reasons, a petition for a rehearing
should be promptly filed and, if it is meritorious,
its form will in no case be scrutinized by this
court.

-3-

Cummings v. Nielson at 624. The argument section of this brief will
establish that, applying these standards, this petition for
rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted.

In

its opinion in State v. Morehouse, No. 860193-CA, slip op. (Utah
App. Jan. 12, 1988) (attached as Appendix A) this Court
misapprehended and misconstrued the facts and law.
POINT: MR. MOREHOUSE WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE DEFENSE
COUNSEL MISUNDERSTOOD UTAH R. EVID. 609 AND, AS A
RESULT, DID NOT CALL MR. MOREHOUSE TO TESTIFY.
In the majority opinion in the present case, after a
brief paragraph discussing the claim of ineffectiveness based on
trial counsel's misunderstanding of the Rules of Evidence, the
majority concludes:
It is difficult to see how the defendant's failure
to testify leads to a reasonable probability that
the result would have been different. Again,
counsel's decision falls within the wide latitude of
legitimate trial tactics.
These two sentences suggest that the majority believes that neither
prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984) and its progeny was met i.e.
that counsel's performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial to
Mr. Morehouse's case.
In reaching such a conclusion, the Court relies on three
premises, each of which is faulty:

(1) that the focus of the

prosecution was on the second fire so the defendant's explanation of
his whereabouts prior to the first fire was unimportant; (2) had Mr.
Morehouse testified, inconsistencies in statements made by various
witnesses and statements made to Mr. Morehouse "would have been
- 4 -

further developed" Morehouse, slip op. at 5; and (3) the jury would
have been informed that Mr. Morehouse had been convicted of a
felony.

Morehouse, Slip op. at 3.
The prosecutor in this case believed that the critical or

crucial issue was the whereabouts of Mr. Morehouse during a period
of approximately one half hour prior to the first fire.

In closing

argument the prosecutor stated:
"The key time being where was the defendant between
7:30 and 8:00, because we know the fire department
is called a little after 8:00. 7:30 to 8:00 then
becomes the crucial period of time."
T. Vol. 6, p. 12.
He later stated:
"But the crucial time is where was he between 7:30
and 8:00? There is no evidence in this case that
indicates where he was except his statement to Mr.
Regan, he was home about an hour."
T. Vol. 6, p. 13.
The prosecutor also stated:
"The second fire, of course, the fire department
leaves at 10:00 and they are called back at 11:05.
These times, I think, are significant in the case
because the real issue is, where was the defendant
between 7:30 and 8:00.
T. Vol. 6, T. 14.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor stated:
"The key time of the first fire is 7:30 to 8:00.
There is no one that can account for the defendant's
whereabouts between 7:30 and 8:00. That is where I
think it is significant."
During the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense counsel
testified:
"The alibi witnesses only filled a small time frame
that needed to be filled. What was most critical
was the one hour of time preceding the first fire.

-5-

The alibi witnesses could not
their presence an hour before
Jones argued very forcibly, I
that that very time frame was
to convict Mr. Morehouse.

place Mr. Morehouse in
the fire, and Mr.
believe to the jury
sufficient upon which

T. Vol. 7, p. 26.
In this case, a critical aspect of the state's theory was that Mr.
Morehouse set the first fire and that he did so during the half hour
period in question prior to the first fire. The state repeatedly
stressed that this half hour period was crucial or critical and
buttressed its argument by pointing out that no evidence as to Mr.
Morehouse's actions or whereabouts during that period had been
presented.

Under such circumstances, where both counsel at trial

believed the period prior to the first fire was critical, where the
state repeatedly stressed the nonexistence of evidence about such
period to support its theory and where Mr. Morehouse would have
presented evidence about such period had he testified, the failure
of Mr. Morehouse to testify prejudiced his case. The majority's
statement that "(t)he focus of the prosecution, however, was on the
second fire" (Morehouse, slip op. at 4) is not based on the facts
and second guesses the determination of the prosecutor, who worked
closely with the case and developed it for trial, that the half hour
period prior to the first fire was critical to the case.
Furthermore, as the dissent points out, had Mr. Morehouse
testified, he would have been in a position to explain his reason
for sitting in a car at the gas station, in plain view of the
neighbors and all others on a busy street, until minutes before the
second alarm was called in "as well as what went on inside the

-6-

building when he entered it."

Morehouse/ slip op. at 11. Hence,

not only was his testimony regarding the time gap prior to the first
fire critical, but his testimony regarding his actions prior to the
second fire was also of importance.
In its majority opinion, the Court also states that had
Mr. Morehouse testified, the inconsistencies in statements would
have been further developed, therefore suggesting that Mr.
Morehouse's testimony would have only hurt his case. On the
contrary, as defense counsel testified, such testimony would have
clarified those inconsistencies and offered the jury a succinct
picture of Mr. Morehouse's whereabouts and actions on the night in
question (T. Vol. 7, p. 36; Morehouse, slip op. at 11 (Jackson, J.
dissenting)

Speculation that Mr. Morehouse's testimony would have

heightened the inconsistencies in statements is not grounded in the
record,

in addition, presenting Mr. Morehouse to the jury would

have erased any questions the jurors might have as to why he was not
testifying, and humanized Mr. Morehouse to the jury.
Finally, the Court bases its conclusion on the fact that
"(t)he jury would have been told, at the very least, that he had
previously been convicted of a felony" Morehouse, slip op. at 5.
The Court does not discuss the basis for such a statement, and in
footnote 2, passes over the argument raised in this appeal as to
whether such convictions would have been admissible for impeachment
purposes by simply stating that Mr. Morehouse has a long record with
several felony convictions and that Utah R. Evid. 609 would permit
the use of those prior convictions to impeach credibility had Mr.
Morehouse testified.

-7-

However, as Mr. Morehouse pointed out in his reply brief
and the dissent notes, there exists considerable question as to
whether Mr. Morehouse's prior convictions would have been
admissible.

Mr. Morehouse's convictions were:

1964
1972
1973
1976
1982

Burglary
Possession of Weapon by Restricted Person
Burglary and Theft
Possession of a Controlled Substance
Driving Under the Influence

As the dissent notes, the DUI conviction was not admissible pursuant
to Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) and the 1964 and 1972 convictions were
more than ten years old and therefore of minimal probative value.
Furthermore, the state did not provide written notice of its intent
to rely on such remote convictions, as required by Utah R. Evid
609(b)(1983) . See also State v. Gentry, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 23
(1987).

Coupling the age of those convictions with their minimal

relevance in determining credibility, and contrasting that with the
prejudicial effect given the nature of the convictions, it is
unlikely that either the 1973 or 1964 conviction would have been
admitted.

(See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) and State

v. Gentry.)
A split in opinion among federal circuits currently
exists as to whether burglary and theft are crimes of dishonesty
under Rule 609(a)(2) or subject only to the balancing test of Rule
609(a)(1).

As briefed by Mr. Morehouse in his reply brief at 3-6

and 10-12, and noted by the dissent in footnote 2 of the slip
opinion at 9, the better reasoned decisions hold that burglary and
theft not arising from fraudulent conduct are not crimes of

-8-

dishonesty or false statement and therefore Rule 609(a)(2) would not
be applicable to the 1973 conviction for Burglary.

This issue is

currently on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bruce,
Case No. 860325, and is pertinent to the present case since, if
609(a)(1) rather than 609(a)(2) is applicable to the 1973 Burglary
and Theft conviction, it is unlikely that the 1973 conviction would
be admissible.

Pursuant to the balancing test set forth in State v.

Banner, at 1334 and State v. Gentry, at 22-3, (1) the crime has
little bearing on veracity, (2) it is very old, (3) because an entry
of a building was involved in the present case, the similarity might
lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad person, (4) credibility
of the defendant was critical in this case comprised solely of
circumstantial evidence and (5) the importance of Mr. Morehouse's
testimony in this case to fill in the time gap prior to the first
fire and otherwise explain inconsistent testimony warrants the
exclusion of convictions. Under this Banner analysis and pursuant
to the concerns set forth in State v. Gentry, it is doubtful that
the state could have sustained its burden under Rule 609(a) of
establishing the probative value of the 1973 conviction for Burglary
and Theft outweighed its prejudicial effect, thereby making it
admissible.

See State v. Gentry at 22.

The remaining conviction in 1976 for possession of
controlled substances likely would be excluded under a similar
analysis.

See Reply Brief at 7-8; State v. Gentry.
In light of the unresolved issue as to whether Utah R.

Evid. 609(a)(2) is applicable to Burglary and Theft crimes, the
remoteness and minimal relevance of the other crimes and the
-9-

concerns addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Gentry, it
is important to this decision that Mr. Morehouse be informed as to
which felony convictions the Court believes would have been admitted.
The Court also seems to suggest in relying on the fact
that "(t)he jury would have been told, at the very least, that he
had previously been convicted of a felony "to support its conclusion
that a jury who heard that Mr. Morehouse was a convicted felon
simply would not believe his version of events.

Such an assumption

points out precisely why, in balancing under Rule 609(a)(1), certain
convictions should not be admitted; the concern that jurors will
punish an accused because he is a bad person rather than because he
committed the particular crime and was not credible in the instance
in question arises repeatedly in Utah law (See State v. Pacheco, 712
P.2d 192 (Utah 1985); State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985);
Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1983) . This statement in the majority opinion
seems to suggest that had the jury known Mr. Morehouse was convicted
of any felony at any time in his life, it would have convicted him
in this instance for being a bad person.

However, felonies are

admissible under 609(a)(1) only for the purpose of impeaching
credibility.

If the majority believes the conviction for Possession

of Controlled Substances was the felony which would have been
admitted, such felony has little to do with credibility and it
cannot be said that a jury informed of such conviction would
necessarily disbelieve Mr. Morehouse.
Where prior convictions are admitted under Rule 609 to
impeach credibility, the jury is generally instructed that the prior
-10-

conviction is to be considered only in deciding the person's
credibility and not for determining whether the defendant is a "bad
person" who acted in conformity with prior activities in committing
the crime in question.
in addition, where a defendant fails to testify, juries
often consider that defendant a "bad person" and wonder what the
defendant is hiding.

Had counsel made a motion to suppress, and, in

the event the court allowed a conviction in, testified on direct to
that conviction coupled with a statement that he was not required to
testify, the jury may well have believed Mr. Morehouse was "coming
clean" with them and found him credible. Hence, a conclusion that
the jury would have convicted Mr. Morehouse had it been informed of
any prior felony conviction is erroneous.
A clear statement as to which prior felony (or felonies)
would have been admitted is important to the majority's decision:
(1) to clarify whether Utah R. Evidence 609(a)(2) is applicable to
crimes of burglary and theft; (2) to clarify whether the Court
believes the state sustained its burden of proving that the
probative value of certain convictions outweighed their prejudicial
effect under Rule 609(a)(1); and (3) to clarify whether a jury
presented with evidence of the prior felony would be likely to
convict Mr. Morehouse.
In its opinion, the Court does not address Mr.
Morehouse's argument that, in addition to the actual prejudice
established in this case, the right of a defendant to testify is so
fundamental that the failure to testify in and of itself is
prejudicial to a defendant's case. Mr. Morehouse cited United
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States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145 (D.Me. 1986) for the proposition
that prejudice can be presumed where counsel incompetency prevents a
criminal defendant from testifying.

While the dissent distinguished

the Butts case, it embraced other cases emphasizing the importance
of a defendant's right to testify.

See Morehouse, slip op. at 12

(Jackson, J. dissenting) citing Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071
(5th Cir. 1978) (Godhold, J. dissenting) cert, denied 439 U.S. 1004
(1978); United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1985).
Furthermore, a close reading of Strickland and its
progeny suggests that the weaker the evidence in a given case, the
more likely that the outcome will be affected by the counsel's
error.

The Strickland Court stated:

"a verdict or conclusion only

weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected
by errors than one with overwhelming record support."
696.

466 U.S. 668,

As Mr. Morehouse argued in Appellant's opening brief at 6-12

and as the dissent acknowledges, "the evidence in this case . . .
was meager" Morehouse, slip op. at 11 (Jackson, J. dissenting).

The

paucity of evidence in this case coupled with the importance of the
one-half hour time gap prior to the first fire, as repeatedly
emphasized by the state in its closing argument, and Mr. Morehouse's
ability to explain his whereabouts during that period as well as
inconsistencies in testimony, in addition to the fundamental
importance of a defendant's right to testify in any case, establish
that Mr. Morehouse was prejudiced by counsel's error in advising him
not to testify.
-12-

The statement in the majority opinion that:

"Again,

counsel's decision falls within the wide latitude of legitimate
trial tactics." (Morehouse, slip op. at 5) misconstrues the evidence
in the present case.

Defense counsel testified that the decision

was not based on tactics, but on a misunderstanding of the
applicable Rule of Evidence, even though it had been in effect three
years (Morehouse slip op. at 7) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
dissent points out:

As the

"reasonably competent defense counsel would

have sought to restrict the prosecutor's use of Morehouse's
convictions at a pretrial hearing conducted in accordance with Rule
609. . ." Morehouse, slip op. at 10 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Defense counsel acknowledged his deficient performance and outlined
his erroneous advice under oath.

Under such circumstances, this

Court misconstrued the facts in stating that the decision was based
on legitimate trial tactics.
Counsel's advice to Mr. Morehouse that he not testify was
the result of deficient performance and not a tactical decision. As
a result of such erroneous advice, Mr. Morehouse was not able to
tell the jury his side of the story and to fill in critical missing
information.

Mr. Morehouse respectfully requests that this Court

reconsider its decision and find that his right to effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution was violated.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Morehouse
respectfully requests that this Petition for Rehearing be granted.
Counsel for Mr. Morehouse certifies that this petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay.
-1 ^-
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APPENDIX A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

State of Utah,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )
)
v.
)
)
James Ace Morehouse,
)

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No. 860193-CA

§ !L» tZ LJ
JAN 121988
Before Judges Jackson, Bench and Davidson.

DAVIDSON, Judge:
Defendant appeals his conviction of aggravated arson on the
grounds of insufficiency of evidence and insufficiency of
counsel. We affirm.
On November 1, 1985, defendant was the lessee and operator
of a gas service station located at 400 E. 1300 S. in Salt Lake
City. At approximately 8:00 p.m. firemen were called to
extinguish a fire in the ceiling over the office in that
building. The fire was extinguished with little real damage
although the ceiling was pulled down to put out any hot spots.
The preliminary cause of the fire was stated to be electrical
since a light fixture was located in the area where the fire
began. No investigator was called and upon the arrival of
defendant the fire department crew left the station in his care.
At approximately 11:00 p.m. the fire department was again
called to the scene to fight another fire, this one in the
office and service bay. The commander on the scene, Lt.
Mauerman, saw that this fire had multiple origins and rather
than being suppressed by water, was being spread as though the
fire was being pushed around by the spray. He immediately
suspected arson and called an investigator. The investigator,
Captain Memmot, arrived on the scene very quickly. He began an
investigation and concluded that the fire was arson caused. In
the course of the investigation that night, he took two rolls
of slides and picked up numerous items of evidence for
preservation and analysis. Captain Memmot was assisted by a

police arson investigator, Detective Clegg, who questioned
several witnesses including defendant. The following day and
again several days later Captain Memmot returned to the station
where he did further investigation and took additional slides.
Several months after the fires, defendant was charged with
the crime of aggravated arson. He was tried before a jury,
convicted and sentenced to prison. This appeal followed.
Defendant first claims the evidence was insufficient to
show arson. The standard of review to be applied to a criminal
jury verdict is well established. The Utah Supreme Court in
the case of State v. Underwood. 737 P.2d 995 (Utah 1987),
outlined the standard.
In reviewing a defendant's conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses. Id.

When there is any evidence, including reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which
findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can be reasonably made, our inquiry stops
and we sustain the verdict.
737 P.2d at 996.
The jury was shown evidence which strongly supported the
conclusion that both fires were intentionally set. Lieutenant
Mauerman testified that the second fire exhibited
characteristics of being caused by a flammable liquid. Also
concerning the second fire, Captain Memmot testified of
multiple points of origin, of pour patterns, burn patterns and
damage characteristic of a flammable liquid being poured and
then ignited. He testified that evidence taken from the fire
scene showed the presence of gasoline. He ruled out the
possibility of an electrical fire testifying to his examination
of the wiring, junction box and circuit breaker box. He
exhibited numerous slides to illustrate his findings and to
show why he made his conclusions. While concluding that both
fires were intentionally caused, he found no connection between
the two.
The jury had before it adequate evidence to conclude that
the fires were intentionally caused. We will not disturb their
findings.
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The defendant next claims the evidence was insufficient to
show that he was responsible for either fire. As is the case
in most arson investigations, the evidence was largely
circumstantial. However, in this case the jury heard from a
neighbor who stated she knew defendant and had done business
with him. She testified that at 11:00 p.m. on the night of the
fires she watched defendant enter the station through a hole in
the door left from the first fire. Immediately after he
entered, the witness heard the sound of breaking glass and saw
flames shoot up in the office area. Defendant then came back
out and entered his automobile.
The jury heard testimony from other witnesses that
supported the eyewitness and controverted defendant's version
of the facts as given through the testimony of his wife.
Testimony was also given as to a possible financial motive for
the defendant to start the fires. We cannot say, from the
evidence presented to the jury, that the evidence Mis
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345 (quoting State v. Petree, 659
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
We next turn to the argument that defendant was denied the
effective assistance of counsel. In the recent case of State v.
Archuleta, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (19.87), the Supreme Court
re-emphasized the requirements necessary to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel as follows:
In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, an appellant must show
(first) that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
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Before this Court will consider whether
specific conduct falls below the required
standard of objective reasonableness, the
person arguing ineffective assistance must
show that the conduct prejudiced his case.
Id. at 697; see also State v. Frame, 723
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). In order to
prove prejudice to his case, "defendant
must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.H Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
69 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16-17.
Defendant raises two specific omissions which he claims
are prejudicial. First is the failure of counsel to object to
evidence seized in warrantless searches. No objection was
raised to any of the evidence and defense counsel made use of
it during cross examination of prosecution witnesses. Later
the defense called an expert witness to testify that the fires
were electrically caused. This expert based his analysis and
conclusion on the same evidence. Had the jury chosen to
believe him, the element of intentional burning could not have
been proven and defendant could not have been found guilty. We
find no prejudice in the failure to object to the evidence.
This clearly falls within legitimate trial tactics of defense
counsel. State v. Pursifell, 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Ct. App.
1987); Lavton Citv v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Utah App.
1987); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 1983).
Defendant next argues that because defense counsel did not
understand a rule of evidence, he was prevented from testifying
in his own behalf. Defendant claims he could explain his
whereabouts prior to the first fire. The focus of the
prosecution, however, was on the second fire.
During the
trial, several witnesses testified as to movements, whereabouts
and statements made by defendant.1 Had defendant testified
1. Several statements made by defendant were admitted through
other witnesses. His wife was also allowed to testify. Several
conflicts were obvious between defendant's statements and the
testimony of his wife. At one point defendant claimed the fire
was started by someone from a mysterious car. This was
supported by testimony from his wife. In a later statement
defendant told the investigator that the occupants of that car
were not HsuspectsM in the fire.
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he would have been subject to cross examination on all this
evidence. Inconsistencies in statements would have been further
developed. The jury would have been told, at the very least,
that he had previously been convicted of a felony.2 It is
difficult to see how the defendant's failure to testify leads to
a reasonable probability that the result would have been
different. Again, counsel's decision falls within the wide
latitude of legitimate trial tactics.
We find no merit in defendant's arguments raised on
appeal. Accordingly the judgment and sentence are affirmed.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

I CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
On appeal, Morehouse claims he was denied his right, under
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, to
effective assistance of counsel at trial because of each of the
following two instances of alleged incompetency .by his retained
counsel: (1) counsel kept Morehouse from testifying in his own
behalf based on counsel's erroneous belief that the rules of
2. Defendant has a long criminal record involving convictions
for several felonies and two prior incarcerations in the Utah
State Prison. Pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609 evidence of prior
criminal convictions may be elicited from the witness to attack
his credibility. By not testifying defendant prevented any
mention of his past criminal activity from reaching the jury.
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evidence would allow the defendant to be impeached on
cross-examination by the introduction of all his previous
criminal convictions; and (2) counsel failed, both before and
during trial, to seek exclusion of evidence seized in
warrantless searches of the gas station after the night of the
fires, as well as the expert opinion testimony based thereon,
I do not address the second alleged error by counsel, although
it adds fuel to the issue of prejudice, because the first is
constitutionally dispositive.
In order to succeed in his claim, Morehouse must
demonstrate that his trial counsel's specific act or omission
fell below an objective standard of professional reasonableness
and that the deficiencies in representation resulted in
prejudice to him. State v. Archuleta, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16
(1987); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (adopting
the two part standard for ineffective assistance of counsel
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
With regard to the first claimed error by appellant's
counsel, there is no question that Morehouse has met the first
part of the Strickland test by showing a specific action that
falls outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance. See State v. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. At their
first consultation, Morehouse told the attorney that he wanted
to testify in his own behalf. He had alibi witnesses1 for
the entire evening of November 1, except for the thirty minutes
just prior to the first fire report. He had been in a public
place with friends for an extended period of time and was home
with his wife within one-half hour, where another witness
phoned him. Only he could tell the jury where he was and what
he was doing at the time the initial fire started. Only he
could explain what he observed and what he did inside the
building prior to the second fire. Before entering, he and his
wife had been sitting in their car in front of the gas station
for a long period, in full view of everyone, including his
neighbor-customer (later key prosecution witness) across the
street. Only he could share with the jury a first-person
account of his claims of innocence.
1. Although the alibi defense was pursued through Morehouse's
other witnesses (without objection from the prosecution), trial
counsel apparently did not file and serve a written notice of
intention to claim alibi, as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-14-2 (1982).
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But his attorney deprived him of his constitutional right to
testify. Counsel erroneously advised him not to testify because
he could be cross-examined concerning all his numerous prior
convictions/ thereby keeping Morehouse off the witness stand and
prohibiting his testimony.
After Morehouse's conviction and sentencing on April 14,
1986/ counsel filed a motion for a new trial. At the hearing on
that motion/ counsel admitted his legal error in misunderstanding
the applicable rule of evidence/ Utah R. Evid. 609, and its effect
on Morehouse. He testified that he did not call Morehouse to the
stand solely because of the defendant's prior convictions/ and
that he had advised Morehouse that/ if he took the stand, he would
be required Mto respond not only as to the fact of his prior
convictions/ but as to the number and nature,H making it
impossible "to make Morehouse presentable to the jury." Counsel
claimed that he subsequently realized his error in not filing a
pretrial motion to restrict the use of Morehouse's convictions for
impeachment purposes when he read the opinion of the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1985), issued the
day of Morehouse's sentencing.
Counsel would not proceed on those adverse admissions as an
appeal tactic if they were not true. He considered his erroneous
advice to be of serious proportions and prejudicial. He was the
only person, other than Morehouse# who knew the full story.
However/ my colleagues/ without the benefit of any greater
knowledge/ deem the matter harmless. I do not.
Appellant's attorney failed to know and understand Utah R.
Evid. 609/ even though it was adopted on April 14, 1983/ three
years before Morehouse's trial/ and became effective September 1,
1983. It is true that the rule, when adopted/ conflicted with the
last sentence of Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 (1987), allowing a
witness to be cross-examined on any previous felony conviction.
But/ even though Banner was the first Utah case to explicitly
declare that portion of the statute superseded by Utah R. Evid.
609/ the Preliminary Note to the 1983 Utah Rules of Evidence
declared that any existing statute inconsistent with the rules was
impliedly repealed with their adoption and that the new rules
provided a fresh starting place for the law of evidence in this
state. The pertinent subsections of Rule 609 state:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness/
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during
cross-examination but only if the crime
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(1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and
the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a
conviction under this rule is not
admissible if a period of more than ten
years has elapsed since the date of the
conviction or of the release of the
witness from the confinement imposed for
that conviction, whichever is the later
date, unless the court determines, in the
interests of justice, that the probative
value of the conviction supported by
specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect. However, evidence of a conviction
more than ten years old as calculated
herein, is not admissible unless the
proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient advance written notice of
intent to use such evidence to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to
contest the use of such evidence.
Morehouse's prior convictions were:
1964
1972
1973
1976
1982

Burglary
Possession of a weapon by a restricted person
Burglary and theft
Possession of a controlled substance
Driving under the influence

Under subsection (a)(1) of Rule 609, the DUI conviction was not
admissible because not punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment. The 19 64 and 1972 convictions, being more than
ten years old, were inadmissible under subsection (b) unless
the court determined that their probative value outweighed
their prejudicial effect, an unlikely result given the nature
of the convictions and the fact that they occurred 22 and 14
years, respectively, before Morehouse's trial for aggravated
arson. The 1973 conviction was potentially admissible under
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subsection (a), because Morehouse had been reimprisoned for
that offense and not released until 1978, less than ten years
before this trial.2 See Utah R. Evid. 609(b). But both that
2. Contrary to the view expressed by the trial judge at the
hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant's 1973 conviction
for burglary was not admissible under subsection (a)(2) as
involving "dishonesty or false statement," i.e., without the
determination required by subsection (a)(1).
In order to
interpret that phrase in our rule, Utah courts must look to the
federal decisions interpreting Fed. Rule Evid. 609(a)(2), State
v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986), recognizing that the
federal courts are not in full agreement on what constitutes
"dishonesty or false statement" under their rule. See
Annotation, Impeachment of Witness bv Evidence of Prior
Conviction, 39 A.L.R. Fed. 570, 596 (1976). I find more
persuasive and better-reasoned those decisions holding that
burglary and theft not arising from fraudulent conduct are not
crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement" within the
meaning of Rule 609(a)(2).
By the phrase "dishonesty and false
statement" the Conference means crimes
such as perjury or subornation of perjury,
false statement, criminal fraud,
embezzlement, or false pretense, or any
other offense in the nature of crimen
falsi, the commission of which involves
some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or
falsification bearing on the accused's
propensity to testify truthfully.
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
(quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9,
reprinted in 1974 U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 7098,
7103). The rule's intent was to limit introduction of prior
convictions for impeachment purposes only to those crimes that
bear directly on a witness's propensity not to tell the truth.
Otherwise, one could argue that any crime could be introduced to
impeach. See United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). Burglary and ordinary theft are not crimes of
dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2)
because they do not involve the credibility-deteriorating quality
contemplated in the rule. See United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d
1269 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Entrekin, 624 F.2d 597 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); United States v.
Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978).

860193-CA

9

conviction and the 1976 possession conviction were admisssible
viaRule 609(a)(1) only after the trial court determined that
their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.3
State v. Gentry, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 22 (1987).
In short/ reasonably competent defense counsel would have
sought to restrict the prosecutor's use of Morehouse's
convictions at a pre-trial hearing conducted in accordance with
Rule 609/ at which it would have been the prosecution's burden to
persuade the court that their probative value outweighed their
prejudicial effect. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334.
Furthermore/ reasonably competent defense counsel would have
known the content of Utah R. Evid. 609 and its applicability to
appellant's circumstances and would have been able to give
Morehouse correct legal advice about the rule's impact on his
right to testify in his own defense.
PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT
Having determined that trial counsel's representation of
Morehouse was demonstrably incompetent/ the next question is
whether that deficiency was prejudicial to appellant.4
3. The factors that should be considered by the trial court in
balancing probative value against prejudicial effect for purposes
of Utah R. Evid. 609 are enumerated in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d
at 1334.
4. I note that at least one federal district court has declined
to apply this second part of the Strickland test where trial
counsel's incompetency kept a criminal defendant from testifying
in his own behalf.
This Court considers a defendant's right to
testify in a criminal proceeding against him so
basic to a fair trial that its infraction can
never be treated as harmless error/ which is in
essence the inquiry required to be made by the
second/ prejudice to the defendant/ prong of
Strickland.
United States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145/ 1148 (D. Me. 1986).
Although/ as here, the issue as presented to the court was the
denial of a sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel/ the Butts court instead recognized a due process right
of the defendant to testify in his own behalf because counsel's
actions had "affected the very fairness of the trial process
itself." Id.. Defendant's motion for a new trial was granted.
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State v. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. In order to substantiate a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show
that a "reasonable probability" exists that, but for counsel's
error, the outcome of the trial would have been different, A
"reasonable probability" is one sufficient to undermine
confidence in the reliability of the verdict. Id.; State v.
Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1204-06 (Utah 1984). See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 491.
The evidence in this case, although legally sufficient to
support a conviction, was meager. There was no affirmative
evidence that Morehouse caused the first fire; moreover, his
behavior the remainder of the night appears inconsistent with
that of the second fire's instigator. The purported
motive—that Morehouse wanted to burn himself out of his
business lease—is highly suspect.
Testimony by Morehouse to explain the half-hour gap in his
alibi was crucial to his case, especially since the
prosecutor's argument focused the jury on the gap. As
previously stated, only he could explain to the jury why he was
sitting in a car at the gas station, in plain view of the
neighbors and all others on the busy street, until minutes
before the second alarm was called in. Only he could tell what
went on inside the building when he entered it.
Morehouse's trial counsel considered that testimony
consequential enough to raise a "reasonable probability" of a
different outcome. Otherwise, trial counsel would not have
filed the highly embarrassing post-trial motion for a new trial.
(footnote 4 continued)
with the court holding that, where ineffective assistance of
counsel deprives a defendant of his right to testify, prejudice
is sufficiently proven from that deprivation. However
sympathetic I may be to this analysis, this court is constrained
to apply both parts of the Strickland test to the case before
us, in light of the conclusion in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at
1335, that the trial court's error in not excluding use of
defendant's convictions for impeachment purposes—which kept
defendant from testifying in his own behalf—"does not reach
constitutional proportion."
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The jury was deprived of the benefit of both hearing and
observing this critical witness. It was not for his attorney
to muzzle him in this manner. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d
1071, 1078 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert.
denied/ 439 U.S. 1004 (1978). -Where the very point of a trial
is to determine whether an individual was involved in criminal
activity, the testimony of the individual himself must be
considered of prime importance.H United States v. Walker, 772
F.2d 1172, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985). Plainly, Morehouse's
testimony had exculpatory potential and would have enhanced his
defense. Jji. (quoting United States v. Larson, 596 F.2d 759,
779 (8th Cir. 1979)).
After a careful review of the testimony and evidence
presented at trial, I am compelled to conclude that there is a
reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been
different if counsel had competently understood the rules of
evidence and not kept Morehouse from testifying. Therefore,
defendant's conviction ought to be reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial.

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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